Department of the army eneral staff, united states army vashington 25. D. C.

CSGID 904.3(PC)



25 February 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Comments on Report: "The Central Intelligence Agency
and National Organization for Intelligence."

- 1. Reference is made to:
- a. Report: "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence," (Dulles Report), dated 1 January 1949.
- b. Momorandum for the Mational Security Council by the Executive Secretary, subject: "The Contral Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence," dated 24 January 1949.
- c. Memorandum for the members of IAC by Director of Contral Intelligence, subject: "Dulles, Correa, Jackson Report," dated
 24 January 1949.
- 2. In accordance with request of the Director of Central Intelligonce, contained in paragraph 3 of reference c above, the following
 comments are made on recommendations and conclusions which are contained in subject report:
 - a. Chapter II (National Intelligence and the National Security Act of 1947) page 27.



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- (1). Concur in the statement that no amendments to intelligence parties of the National Security Act of 1947 are deemed necessary at this time.
- (2). Concur in the statement that CIA is properly placed in governmental atmoture.
- (3). It is not considered appropriate to comment on the necessity for establishment of closer lisison between the Director of Contral Intelligence and the Secretaries of State and Defense.
- b. Chapter III (The Organization and Administration of
 The Central Intelligence Agency), pages 38 & 39.

 It is not considered appropriate to comment on
 internal organization and administration of the CIA.
 - a. Chapter IV (The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for the Coordination of Intelligence Activities), page 63.
- (1). The Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, does not concur in the statement that the responsibility of CIA with respect to coordination of intelligence activities has not been fully discharged. It is considered that the argument advanced in this report that CIA has a mandate to control activities of various departmental agencies is not sound and is based on an interpretation of the law not shared by the National Socurity Council as is evidenced by its publication



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ontrol by the Director, Central Intelligence by resort to individual recommendations to ESC would be faced by the possibility of obstruction by the Secretary of Defense and/or by individual members of the ESC proper. It is a basic assumption that the Director of Central Intelligence, who is not a part of the Eatienal Ellitary Establishment, has not a mandate to supervise, direct, or control the Service intelligence agencies which are intelligence staffs responsible to their respective Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries. The Director of Intelligence is of the opinion that such deficiencies as exist in the coordination of intelligence activities can and should be corrected by appropriate action of the Intelligence

- (2). Concur in the statement that more active efforts and coordination are needed in the field of scientific intelligence.
- (3). It is considered that the Department of Justice should be consulted as to the advisability of FEI being included in membership of the IAC. The Director of Intelligence, GSUSA, has no objection to its being included, if it is mutually desirable with Director of Central Intelligence and FEI.



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(4). Non-concur in the statement that Director of Central Intelligence should be permanent chairman of USCIB. It is further felt that this question is not in the purview of the IAC.

- (5). Concur in the statement that more active participation in coordination of intelligence activities by IAC is desirable.
- (6). Non-concur in limiting membership on IAC to Director of Central Intelligence and representatives of State.

 Army, Navy, Air Force and FM. Continued membership of AEC and JIG is desirable.
- (7). It is not considered appropriate for the Director of Intelligence to comment on the organization and functions of Interdorartmental Coordinating and Flanning Staff. This is considered a matter of primary concern to Director of Central Intelligence.
- (8). Commonts in paragraph 7 above also apply to question of reassignment of responsibilities now performed by office of Collection and Dissemination. This is an internal CIA problem.
 - d. Chapter V (The Responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency for National Intelligence Estimatos), page 81.

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(1). Concur in the statement that there has been confusion in CIA with regard to national intelligence estimates and miscellaneous research and reporting activities. There have been incidents where CIA has prepared estimates covering the fields of primary concern to other agencies without consultation. This indicated either lack of coordination or the placing of too much dependence on Service personnel within the CIA organization.

- (2). Comour in the statement that the provisions of Marional Security Act for the production of national estimates are sound, but have not been effectively carried out.
- (5). It is not considered appropriate to comment on the creation of a small estimates division within the CIA, this being an internal organization problem.
- (4). Concur in the statement that national estimates should be submitted for discussion and approval by the IAC.
- (5). Concur in the statement that provision should be made for handling of "crisis situation" estimates, but consider that IAC can and will perform this function.
- (6). Concur in the statement that such coordinated national intelligence estimates must be recognized as the most authoritative.



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e. Chapter VI (Services of Common Concern: Intelligence Research and Reports) page 91.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on organization within CIA to accomplish CIA research function.

f. Chapter VII (Services of Common Concern: The Collection of Overt Intelligence) page 104.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on the organization within CIA to perform the function of collection of overt intolligence.

g. Chapter VIII (Services of Common Concern: The Collection of Secret Intelligence) page 129.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on the organization within CIA to perform the function of collection of secret intelligence.

h. Chapter IX (Services of Common Concern: The Conduct of Secret Operations) page 154.

It is not considered appropriate to commont on the organization within CIA to porform the conduct of scoret operations.

 Chapter X (The Direction of the Central Intelligence Agency) page 138.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on the direction of Central Intelligence Agency.

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- (1). Concur in the statement that Service intelligence agencies have manifested increased interest and more cooperative attitude in intelligence matters.
- (2). Non-concur in the statement that Service intelligence gence agencies should be staffed with permanent intelligence specialists. Intelligence Division does subscribe to the theory that there should be semi-permanent specialization in intelligence by a small percentage of semior officers.
- (3). Consur in the statement that more active program by CIA in fields of common interest would result in higher degree of centralization and coordination.
- (4). Concur in the statement that Service intelligence agencies should confine themselves to their respective fields of primary intelligence interest.
- (5). Concur in the statement that there should be effective coordination between JIC. CIA and IAC in preparation of national intelligence estimates.
 - k. Chapter XII (The Intelligence Functions of the Department of State) page 161.

It is not considered appropriate to comment on intolligence organization and functions of the State Department.

> (Signed) S. LeRoy Irwin S. LeRoy IRWH Major General, GSC Director of Intelligence

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